University of Alabama in Huntsville

LOUIS
Honors Capstone Projects and Theses

Honors College

12-1-2017

Of Microbes and Men: The Effects of Men, Meat, Media and a
Microbe on an Industry
Rachel Marie Byrd

Follow this and additional works at: https://louis.uah.edu/honors-capstones

Recommended Citation
Byrd, Rachel Marie, "Of Microbes and Men: The Effects of Men, Meat, Media and a Microbe on an
Industry" (2017). Honors Capstone Projects and Theses. 95.
https://louis.uah.edu/honors-capstones/95

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at LOUIS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors Capstone Projects and Theses by an authorized administrator of LOUIS.

Byrd 1

Of Microbes and Men
The Effects Of Men, Meat, Media, And A Microbe On An Industry
by

Rachel Marie Byrd

An Honors Capstone
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Honors Diploma
to
The Honors College
of
The University of Alabama in Huntsville

December 1, 2017

Honors Capstone Director: Dr. Stephen Waring
Professor of History

1

Capstone Formatting Guide.

Honors College
Frank Franz Hall
+1 (256) 824-6450 (voice)
+1 (256) 824-7339 (fax)

HONORS COLLEGE

honors@uah.edu

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE

Honors Inests copyngnt t'enntsston
This form must be signed by the student and submitted as a bound part of the thesis.
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors Diploma or
Certificate from The University of Alabama in Huntsville, I agree that the Library of this University
shall make it treely available tor inspection. I turther agree that permission tor extensive copying
for scholarly purposes may be granted by my advisor or, in his/her absence, by the Chair of the
Department, Director of the Program, or the Dean of the Honors College. It is also understood
that due recognition shall be given to me and to The University of Alabama in Huntsville in any
scholarly use which may be made of any material in this thesis.

Student Name (printed)

~~:11_01:'fDate

Byrd 2

Table of Contents
Abstract

3

Introduction

4

Investigating Escherichia Coli

7

The Outbreak

14

The Hearing

16

Media Madness

28

After The Outbreak

33

Conclusion

39

Bibliography

41

Byrd 3

Abstract
This paper will investigate the relationships between men, meat, media, and microbes. It
begins with the discovery of the microbe itself, Escherichia coli. A brief discussion of the
physical qualities of the microbe and its toxicity follows. The next section reviews several
important discoveries made in the twentieth century regarding E. coli. These discoveries reveal
the growing concern of the scientific community in regards to the public health threat presented
by E.coli. Then, in 1993, several children ingested the microbe and died. After this tragic event,
the United States government held an extensive hearing investigating food safety practices. The
interactions in this hearing reveal several shortcomings of regulatory and handling practices,
despite scientific evidence. Throughout these events, the outbreak and the hearing, the reports of
the media provide profound insight into the parties widely blamed for the outbreak. There is a
strong tendency to assign blame to solely to a company, instead of analyzing the complex
interactions between business, science, and government. Finally, a similar outbreak occurred in
2015, revealing a trend between public pressure and widespread change.
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Introduction

Escherichia coli. People cannot see it with the naked eye. It lives in public pools. It lives
in lakes. It lives on lettuce. It flourishes on meat products. It swims in your gut. It can make you
sick, with symptoms ranging from minor nausea to life threatening diarrhea, kidney failure, and
even death. Escherichia coli causes roughly 265, 000 illnesses per year in the United States
alone. Scientists connected it to food borne illness in 1982, but the public didn't know about it
until 1993. It made headlines by causing approximately four hundred people, predominately
children, in the Pacific Northwest to fall ill. It skyrocketed to fame with the deaths of three
children attributed to a particularly virulent strain, O157:H7. The number of deaths eventually
rose to four children, all under the age of seven. To contract the bacteria that eventually claimed
their lives, they had merely eaten a burger from their favorite restaurant.
Jack in the Box, the restaurant that had supplied the tainted burgers, complied with all
federal laws regarding food safety. Evidence suggested that an internal cooking temperature of
155°F would dramatically lower the risk of transmitting food-borne illness. Despite the evidence
suggesting that the temperature needed raising, federal regulations only required a cooking
temperature of 140°F. E. coli was a known threat to public health since 1983 and scientific
inquiry had determined that federal regulations were too relaxed. However, when the outbreak
reached the public, blame fell not primarily on the federal government, or the failure to utilize
scientific discovery. Instead, the company that served the burgers received much of the backlash.
The failure to utilize the latest scientific evidence to improve regulations lead to the
illness of hundreds of people and the deaths of four children. The media praised the government
for the measures taken after the outbreak occurred: hiring new inspectors, investigating the
outbreak, adding warning labels to raw meat. However, these measures were retroactive, instead
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of the proactive measures that could have saved lives. The media focused on the company that
served the contaminated burgers, instead of the system that allowed an avoidable contamination
to reach hundreds of consumers. The failures of the Jack in the Box outbreak stem from the
refusal from all responsible parties-from the government to business managers-to pass stricter
regulations, despite scientific evidence, and the focus the media brought to the company, instead
of the faulty system. The Jack in the Box outbreak reveals that connections between scientific
evidence, communication between scientists and regulators, the priorities of federal regulatory
agencies, the prerogatives of business managers, the media, and pressure generated by the public
are key components for system modification.
The newspapers following the outbreak, a Senate subcommittee hearing, the public
relations efforts by the Jack in the Box Company, and scientific journals on E. coli form the
evidence for this study. These sources establish the difference between public and specialized
knowledge. They confirm that experts knew of the potential threats of E.coli. They demonstrate
the reaction the media promoted. However, each of these sources must analyzed for their initial
intent, and the biases resulting from these intents. For example, some decisions by Jack in the
Box sought to save the reputation of the company in the face of crisis, such as offering to pay the
medical expenses of the victims. Newspapers reported the news, but with the goal of selling
copies. Since, these sources originate from a disaster, they run the risk of containing the highly
emotional biases of those caught in a confusing and frightening time.
Some experts have studied the outbreak. Jeff Benedict's analysis of the Jack in the Box
outbreak looks into the causes, responses, and consequences surrounding the crisis. While his
book Poisoned is an excellent addition to medico-legal thrillers, it fails to investigate the
pathology of E. coli. He focuses on the impact of one exceptional man, Bob Marler, the leading
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lawyer in the following lawsuits who "does thing most lawyers wouldn't dare." Benedict
investigates the legal actions and dedication Marler brought to the issue of food poisoning. By
focusing on Marler and the legal journey of the food poisoning case, he misses the opportunity to
address causation of the event or proactive measures to avoid future outbreaks. He merely
suggests the influences of scientific discovery and the impact of the media. It is an excellent
summary of the event, but does not investigate these topics in-depth.
Jeffery Bradach investigates the retroactive measures the Jack in the Box company took
in response to the E. coli outbreak. He specifically focuses on the challenges that large
companies face when their credibility faces attacks. He argues that this is particularly
challenging for companies that have franchised, they must maintain an image of uniformity
across a system rife with small variations. These variations can cause a myriad of problems. His
analysis falls short in its analysis of the outbreak specifically. It mentions it briefly, but his
argument is based on chain management. 1
Robert Ulmer and Timothy Sellnow investigate the communication from Jack in the Box
Robert Nugent following the outbreak of the crisis to analyze the ethics of the company. They
suggest that companies reveal their ethical concerns after crises through communications to the
public. They focus on three aspects of post-crisis communications: questions regarding evidence,
intent, and locus. This analysis is useful for companies following high-stakes crisis. However it
fails to analysis causation, but does imply that Jack in the Box's communications after the
outbreak were "ethically suspect."2

1

Jeffiey L. Bradach, "Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains,"
Administrative Science Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1997): 276-303. doi: 10.2307/2393921.
2
Robert R. Ulmer and Timothy L. Sellnow, "Consistent Questions of Ambiguity in
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Investigating Escherichia coli
In the mid-nineteenth century, Theodor Escherich spent years studying illness in children,
focusing on diseases of digestion. In Italy, he personally observed a cholera epidemic and the

Vibrio cholerae bacterium responsible for the devastating illness. He was a believer in the germ
theory, that organisms too small to see without a microscope could wreak havoc on entire
societies. He used cutting-edge technology, from Gram staining to anaerobic culture methods, to
investigate a rod-shaped bacterium known as Bacterium coli commune. In Munich, on July 14,
1885, he presented his research. He published it a year later, a one-hundred and seventy-seven
page summary titled "The Intestinal Bacteria of the Infant and Their Relation to the Physiology
of Digestion." Later, the scientific community renamed the bacterium that he investigated to

Escherichia coli in tribute to the man who catapulted E. coli to notoriety by connecting it to
diarrhea in children. 3

Escherichia coli is a Gram-negative rod-shaped bacterium, referring to the structure of its
membrane and the overall shape of the organism. Figure 1 provides an image of E.coli. It is a
facultatively aerobic organism, with few growth factors. Growth factors are certain nutrients that
organisms need to survive. E. coli is concentrated in the gut of warm-blooded animals, such as
humans, cattle, and chicken. 4 It is comprised of 5,594,477 nucleotide base pairs, which is

Organizational Crisis Communication: Jack in the Box as a Case Study," Journal ofBusiness Ethics 25, no.
2 (2000): 143-55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25074306
3

Stanford T Shulman, Herbert C Friedmann, and Ronald H. Sims, "Theodor Escherich: The First Pediatric
Infectious Diseases Physician?" Clinical Infectious Diseases 45 (2007): 1025-1029. Accessed March 29,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1086/521946
4
Michael T. Madigan, John M. Martinko, Kelly S. Bender, Daniel H. Buckley, and David S.Stahl, The Brock
Biology ofMicroorganisms 14th ed, edited by Kelsey Churchman, (New York: Pearson Education, 2015), 486-487
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approximately one one-thousandth of a human genome. 5 Invisible to the naked eye, it lives in the
intestine, and can create calamity.

Figure 1. E. coli under a Scanning Electron Microscope. Photograph by Janice Haney Carr.
Accessed November 1, 2017. https://www.eurekalert.org/multimedia/pub/86125.php

Escherichia coli produces a specific form of toxin, an AB toxin that hijacks cell

operations, causing illness. Many other disease-causing bacterium, such as Vibrio cholera, the
cause of cholera, produce this highly virulent form of toxin. Shigella dysteneriae produces an AB
toxin, leading to dysentery. Two components, referred to as "A" and "B," compose the toxin as a
whole. Figure 2 illustrates the roles of each subunit and the mechanism of the toxin. Prior to
intoxication of the cell, the B subunit recognizes and binds to the target cell. The A subunit
enters the cytoplasm, disrupts functioning of the cell, preventing protein synthesis, and

5

Madigan, 321.
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ultimately leading to the death of the cell.6 The E. coli 0157: H7 subtype, the subtype connected
to the 1993 outbreak, produces a form of AB toxin that is particularly virulent. 7

r

~ype Ill Exotoxin

/

B Component
A Component

Figure 2. AB Toxin Mechanism. Illustration by Marie Bello. In Microbiology. By Linda
Bruslind. Pressbook Sites. Accessed November 11, 2017.
https://openoregonstate.pressbooks.pub/microbiology/chapter/bacterial-pathogenicity/

One of the most malignant side effects of an E. coli O 157: H7 infection is hemolytic
uremia syndrome, often abbreviated as HUS. In 1964, scientists connected HUS to kidney
failure, distorted red blood cells, decreased blood platelets, and destruction of red blood cells. A
common symptom is bloody diarrhea. HUS first became associated with E.coli 0157: H7 in
1970, and confirmed in human subjects in 1978. A paper, published in 1986, explicitly stated the
links between HUS and ground beef. It called for the testing of all bloody diarrhea for E. coli
0157: H7, and stated that the organism "should be given the same consideration as other food

6

7

Madigan, 719.
Madigan, 487.

Byrd 10

borne organisms in both clinical practice and public health control."8 By 1986, scientists raised
public health concerns due to the well-established connection between HUS and E. coli
0157:H7.

In 1975, scientists isolated E. coli 0157: H7 for the first time, but did not connect it to
food until 1982. In early 1982, an outbreak affected forty-seven people. It originated from eating
at a chain fast-food restaurant, specifically branches in Oregon and Michigan. Research
determined all of the patients had eaten a beef patty, rehydrated onions, and pickles. Further
research determined that the beef patty, undercooked, was the culprit that carried the illnesscausing agent to the unsuspecting consumers. 9 However, the restaurant conducted research
following the outbreak. As a result, it invested in new grills and instituted a higher cooking
temperature for its burgers. However, lack of government regulation prevented the new research
from proactively impacting the rest of the industry. 10
In Washington, during March 1984, three cases of illness due to E. coli O 157:H7
progressed to HUS. 11 In 1986, pathogenic E. coli reached one-hundred and seven children at a
daycare center. Forty-eight percent of the exposed population under four years old contracted

8

JC Hockin and H Lior, "Hemorrhagic colitis due to Escherichia coli O157:H7. A rare disease?," Canadian Medical

Association Journal 134(1986): 25-26,
http://resolver.ebscohost.com.elib.uah.edu/openurl?sid=EBSCO:edb&genre=article&issn=08203946&ISBN=&volu
me=l34&issue=l &date=l 986010 l&spage=25&pages=2526&title=CMAJ:%20Canadian%20Medica1%20Association%20Journal&atitle=Hemorrhagic%20colitis%20due%2
0to%20Escherichia%20coli%20O I 57%3AH7 .%20A%20rare%20disease%3F&aulast=Hockin%2C%20J.%20C.&id
=DOI,;_(Accessed March 29, 2017)
9

Lee Riley and et. al, "Hemorrhagic Colitis Associated with a Rare Escherichia coli Serotype," The New England
Journal ofMedicine 308 (1983): 681-685. DOI: 10.1056/NEJM19830324081203
1°Benedict,

52-53.
"Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome Associated with Escherichia coli O157:H7 Enteric Infections United States, 1984,"
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 34, no 2 (1985). Accessed March 29, 2017.
htq,://www.jstor.org.elib.uah.edu/stable/24243 l 80
11
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illness. Thirty-one percent of the sick children exhibited bloody diarrhea. The outbreak
culminated in three confirmed cases of HUS. None of the children died. 12 In London, 1987,
seventeen nursing home residents died due to HUS caused by E.coli 0157: H7 infections. 13 By
1988, twelve total outbreaks of E. coli 0157: H7 in North America and Britain had led to HUS.
It was known that E. coli O 157: H7 was in three to seven percent of beef samples. The
continuing and increasingly frequent outbreaks proved the virulence ofO157:H7. It's virulence
emphasized the importance of being able to accurately identify 0157: H7.
Early studies of E.coli reveal the growing concerns of the scientific community. In 1984,
a study determined that E. coli can survive for months in frozen conditions. At 10°C, E. coli does
not grow, but is still alive. This study demonstrated that the common storage conditions of
processed meat-frozen-does not eradicate the chances to contract diseases caused by E. coli.
The study also criticized two methods to test for E. coli that were growing in popularity, but did
not detect O157:H7 reliably. 14 Another study, conducted in 1986, criticized a popular but
"nonspecific" test and recommended additional tests to specifically identify the O157:H7
strain. 15 The ability to isolate and identify an organism is critical to the ability to effectively
12

John S Spika and et. al, "Hemolytic uremic syndrome and diarrhea associated with Escherchia coli O157:H7 in a
day care center," The Journal ofPediatrics 109(1986): 287-291,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002234 7686803 869 (Accessed March 29, 2017).
13
C, Krishan, VA Fitzgerald, SJ Dakin, and R J Behme, "Laboratory investigation of outbreak of hemorrhagic
colitis caused by Escherichia coli 0157:87," Journal ofClinical Microbiology 25(1987): 1043-1047, https://wwwncbi-nlm-nih-gov.elib.uah.edu/pmc/articles/PMC269133/?page=4 (Accessed March 29, 2017)
14J

C Hoclcin and H Lior, "Hemorrhagic colitis due to Escherichia coli O157:H7. A rare disease?," Canadian

Medical Association Journal 134(1986): 25-26. Accessed March 29, 2017.
http://resolver.ebscohost.com.elib.uah.edu/openurl?sid=EBSCO:edb&genre=article&issn=08203946&ISBN=&volu
me= l 34&issue= 1&date= 19860 IO I &spage=25&pages=2526&title=CMAJ :%20Canadian%20Medical%20Association%20Joumal&atitle=Hemorrhagic%20colitis%20due%2
0to%20Escherichia%20coli%20O l 57%3AH7. %20A%20rare%20disease%3F&aulast=Hockin%2C%20J .%20C.&id
=DOI:
15
M P Doyle and J L Schoeni, "Survival and growth characteristics of Escherichia coli associated
with hemorrhagic colitis," Applied and Enviornmental Microbiology 48, no 4 (1984): 855-856. Accessed March 28,
2017.http://resolver.ebscohost.com.elib.uah.edu/openurl?sid=EBSCO:cmedm&genre=article&issn=00992240&ISB
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respond to an outbreak. The concerns of scientific community regarding accurate identification
demonstrate that the community understood the ability of0157:H7 to cause devastating illness
by 1986, seven years prior to the Jack in the Box outbreak. These concerns, published in
reputable and widely-read journals, repeatedly recommended better testing strategies.
A plethora of studies concerning E. coli screening, isolation, and identification emerged
around 1986. A 1987 study isolated E.coli from various retail meats, such as pork, poultry, beef,
and lamb. It determined that beef had the highest percentage of E. coli. 16 A 1991 study
confirmed the presence of E. coli 0157: H7 in raw milk. This demonstrated that "cattle are a
major reservoir of E. coli serotype 0157:H7. It recommended continued studies into the various
sources of E.coli and methods of identification ''to prevent this growing health problem." 17
Another 1991 study investigated the accuracy of existing procedures to rapidly detect E.

coli and proposed a different testing method. It argued that direct plating methods were not
sensitive to small concentrations of E.coli. The time-consuming and expensive methods
occasionally signaled a false positive. A new method suggested by the study was "rapid,
sensitive, and easy to perform." It took less than twenty hours to specifically identify the 0157:

N=&volume=48&issue=4&date= 19841001 &spage=855&pages=8556&title=Ap_plied%20And%20Environmental%20Microbiology&atitle=Survival%20and%20growth%20characteristi
cs%20of%20Escherichia%20coli%20associated%20with%20hemorrhagic%20colitis.&aulast=Doyle%20MP&id=D
01
16
MP Doyle and J L Schoeni, "Isolation of Escherichia coli O157:H? from retail fresh meats and poultry," Applied
and Environmental Microbiology 53 (1987): 2394-2396, http://aem.asm.org/content/53/10/2394.short (Accessed
January 19, 2017).
17

JG Wells and et al, "Isolation of Escherichia coli serotype O157:H7 and other Shiga-like-toxin
producing E.coli from dairy cattle," Journal ofClinical Microbiology 29, no 5(1991):985-989. Accessed March 29,
2012. http://jcm.asm.org/content/29/5/985.abstract
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H7 strains. 18 The interest in detection demonstrates that 0157: H7 was an entrenched concern of
the scientific community prior to the 1993 outbreak.
Prior to 1993, the scientific community understood E. coli, the 0157: H7 strain, and its
connections to food borne illness were well established. Scientists conducted many studies on the
organism, usually concluding with public health concerns or the need to begin further studies.
They knew the virulence of the 0157: H7 strain. They knew the symptoms of bloody-diarrhea
and hemolytic-uremia syndrome. They knew about the presence of E.coli 0157: H7 in the food
supply. Or, rather, the scientific community knew these facts. However, emerging evidence did
not impact regulations. Additionally, the general public had limited knowledge of the dangers
that they faced by 0157: H7. They could not see the insidious risk inherent in enjoying a burger
from their preferred fast food chain.

18

NV Pad.bye and MP Doyle, "Rapid Procedure for detecting enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli 0157:87 in
food," Applied and Environmental Microbiology 57(1986): 25-26. Accessed March 29, 2017.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 183642/?page=5
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The Outbreak

It was the day after Christmas. The six-year-old had stayed home from school less than a
week ago. Now, she laid comatose in a hospital bed, as her mother sang to her and painted her
toenails one last time. She had gone to the hospital with a case of bloody diarrhea. Despite
medical treatment, her kidneys shut down. After five days of rapidly deteriorating conditions,
Lauren Rudolph's parents removed her from life support.
Mid-January 1993, two-year-old Michael Nole checked into Mary Bridge Children's
Hospital. After two days, his diarrhea worsened and doctors recommended transfer to Children's
Hospital in Seattle, for kidney dialysis. His condition continued to disintegrate. After extensive
surgery, his heart stopped on January 22, 1993. On January 28, Celina Shribbs perished due to
heart failure.
All three children had eaten burgers at Jack in the Box shortly prior to their deaths. They
all contracted hemolytic-uremia syndrome (HUS). Declaring an outbreak took several weeks, as
illustrated by Figure 3. By late January, Children's Hospital in Seattle had hundreds of patients
with diarrhea, and approximately thirty patients with conditions that progressed to HUS. Survival
rates of HUS victims were not encouraging. The illness, now connected to E. coli and Jack in the
Box burgers, would certainly claim more young lives. 19

19

Jeff, Benedict, Poisoned: The True Story ofthe Deadly E. Coli Outbreak That Changed The Way Americans Eat,
New York: February Books, 2011
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Timeline for Reporting Cases of E. coli 0157 Infection
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Figure 3. Timeline for Reporting Cases ofE. coli 0157 Infection. Center for Disease Control.
Accessed November 11, 2017. https://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/pdfs/CDC-E.-coli-Factsheet.pdf
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The Hearing
The outbreak in Seattle caused a stir. The public, previously unaware of the pathogen E.

coli, rapidly lost trust in the safety of fast-food establishments. In effort to combat the growing
concern and to establish a plan to avoid future outbreaks, Congress held a hearing on February 5,
1993. Senator Tom Daschle chaired the Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General
Legislation. The questions and comments of the subcommittee conducting the investigation
provide invaluable insight into the concerns of the governing body. The drama of the hearing
unfolded as various expert witnesses attempted to assign blame, defend themselves, and offer
solutions to avoid future outbreaks.
During the opening remarks of the hearing, Daschle quickly admitted that the current
testing methods required by federal law were not stringent enough. Inspectors visually checked
meat for adulterants such as blood, bone fragments, and feces. This extremely outdated
inspection method originated in the early 1900s. Federal law did not require testing for
microbiological contaminant'). Daschle criticized an "unresponsive government" for failing to
enforce an increase in testing standards, recommended by the subcommittee in 1989. He stated
that the E. coli O157:H? strain was ''relatively new," despite its isolation in 1975 and connection
to foodborne illness in 1982-roughly a decade prior to the outbreak. He omitted these dates
from his opening address. 20
"We don't need another report on food safety, we need some action on food safety,"
Senator Leahy demanded in his opening remarks. He continued by stating the known facts of E.

20

U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, 1993, 4 hours, National Cable Satellite Corporation, 1993.
Accessed March 29, 2017. https://www.c-span.org/video/?37757-l/us-meat-inspection
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coli: refrigeration and freezing would not kill it and very small numbers of the organism could
cause infection, wreaking havoc. He failed to include that this knowledge was not recently
discovered-scientists had known E. coli is capable of surviving freezing since 1984. The next
speaker, Senator Craig, carefully reminded the hearing that it had not gathered ''to determine
guilt or innocence."21 He then proceeded to subtly defend the legislative body from potential
accusations of guilt by declaring that everyone-from lawmakers, to food processors, to
restaurants, to the consumer-is responsible for food safety. He affirmed that food safety was
''not the sole responsibility of the govemment."22
The initial remarks of the subcommittee reveal deep concern over the potential
culpability for the outbreak. By withholding information regarding the dates of scientific
discoveries regarding E. coli and strain 0157:H7, the senators created the illusion that this
information surfaced shortly before or in result of the outbreak. The illusion contributed to a
sense of action regarding the outbreak. The statements directly regarding responsibility for food
safety carefully mitigate the role of the legislative body in determining standards of inspection
and regulation. Daschle admitted the current system of inspection was outdated and called for a
"science-based risk assessment" system. 23 He and the other senators accepted that the
government was partially at fault for the outbreak. Through the elimination of specific dates
connected to the discovery of key evidence, they dramatically reduced the complete failure of the
governing body to utilize scientific evidence in determining standards of inspection and
regulation.

21

U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, 1993
U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, 1993
23
U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, 1993
22
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The first panel of witnesses called forth in the hearing addressed issues within the system
and proposed plans to prevent future outbreaks. Mike Espy, the recently sworn-in Secretary of
Agriculture, Russell Cross of the Food Safety and Inspection Service, and Jill Hollingsworth of
the Department of Agriculture comprised this first panel of witnesses.
By pleading with the public to ensure all meat was cooked thoroughly, Espy danced
around the question of culpability. Espy's initial statement, regarding food safety, included a plea
to "stop trying to blame someone else ... we must all share the responsibility." He stated that all
investigations indicate the meat inspectors had done their job successfully, according to the
current system in place. He emphasized that the industry could never achieve "a zero-pathogen
level," warned the public to ensure the consistent cooking of their meat, and cautioned
consumers of rare meat that ''you assume the risk. " 24
Espy later admitted that there were five-hundred and fifty vacant food inspector
positions, with a total of seven-thousand and two hundred inspectors nationwide. Filling these
vacancies required paying the new inspectors a salary, an issue of funding he foresaw. He
mentioned future testing methods, but advised implementation of these methods would be costly.
He gave an estimated cost of fifty-eight billion dollars to test only twenty percent of the
industry's meat products. Espy informed the committee that fourteen food safety strategies could
be implemented within a year, based on "existing research." These statements regarding the cost
of improvements to the system, coupled with the admission of current research indicate that
proactive measures-from properly filling the ranks of inspectors to the utilization of cuttingedge testing methods-were available but not pursued prior to the outbreak.25

24
25

U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, 1993
U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, 1993
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When addressing the subcommittee, Russell Cross affinned that "food safety is
everyone's business" and a "nationwide effort." He proposed several "revolutionary" methods to
fix flaws in a system that had existed, unaltered at its core, since 1906. Senator Craig questioned
the logic in devoting more resources to the identification of chemical adulterants, which caused
only one and a half percent of all food borne illnesses, when biological adulterants caused
approximately ninety-five percent of illness. Cross explained that they could not simply stop
monitoring for chemical adulterants and shift the resources to testing for biological
contaminants.26 Again, the topics of funding, costs, and the admission of knowledge that better
methods existed arise.
Cross confessed that qualified applicants could fill only one-hundred and sixty of the
inspector vacancies. The system could not produce enough candidates to run effectively, even if
funding was not an issue. Cross proposed a multi-point control system that covered food
production from "farm to table." Craig described the proposal as a "massive undertaking,"
revealing an attitude hesitant to the critical changes for public health. On the relationship
between his organization and researchers, Cross claimed that they utilized all available data, but
later described the communication between with researchers as needing improvement.27 Once
more, the breakdown between regulatory agencies, researcher, and the utilization of scientific
evidence surfaced.

In stark comparison to the multi-person panel that preceded (and those that followed)
him, Robert Nugent comprised the entirety of the second panel. He, the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Jack in the Box, appeared before the subcommittee to provide testimony on

26

27

U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, 1993
U.S. Meat Inspection: February 5, /993
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the events leading up to the outbreak. His opening remarks asserted that the meat served in his
restaurants complied to the established federal standards and passed all federal inspections. He
cited the Center for Disease control, stating that thousands of cases of E. coli 0157:H7 had been
reported-and that food served as the vehicle of transmission for some of those cases. He
declared that "clearly the USDA meat inspection system and federal food preparation standards
are not providing the protection Americans deserve. Better safeguards are needed. " 28
The committee responded to Nugent's testimony by bombarding him with questions
regarding the procedures at Jack in the Box specifically. These questions varied from concerns
with the internal temperatures of the patties regarding established standards, to the frequency of
grill and patty inspections, and the temperatures and types of the grills in Jack in the Box. The
subcommittee grilled him with questions on the failure to exceed, rather than meet, minimum
standards and the ages of the chefs in his restaurants. Nugent responded to all these questions
with some confusion. This bewilderment seemed partially directed at the types of questions
posed to him and partially due to confusion regarding his own answers. When asked about the
execution process of internal checks of the patties, Nugent replied that the process was unknown
to him, but that it created "a high degree of awareness to achieve an environment in which this
situation won't occur again."29 The specificity of the questions, directed at Jack in the Box's
procedures, created a sense of culpability for the outbreak. Nugent's confusing answers
suggested a confirmation of the restaurant's role in the outbreak.
Senator Leahy asked a nervous-looking Nugent to explain why Jack in the Box failed to
follow the state standard for internal temperature of meat. Nugent clarified that Jack in the Box
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followed all federal standards-and held every intention of exceeding them. By the federal
standards, the restaurant could not be faulted. Senator Daschle, the chair of the subcommittee,
directly inquired into the microbiology experts presumably employed by Jack in the Box's parent
company, Foodmaker Incorporated. Nugent defended the food preparation process in place- no
illnesses could be connected to Jack in the Box since its founding in the 1950s. He continued
"historically, we have relied on the government and our suppliers to provide us any information
that would suggest that we need to make adjustments in our standards."30 With these two
responses, Nugent attempted to place the blame on the federal government for its failure to raise
federal standards. His endeavor fell flat. Jack in the Box's unofficial, televised, trial ended-and
the restaurant appeared negligent. The guilty verdict fell resoundingly.
The third panel of witnesses comprised of representatives of the Centers for Disease
control-Dr. Paul Blake-and the Food and Drug Administration- Dr. Douglass Archer. Blake
testified that individual states determine which diseases should be reportable to the Centers for
Disease Control. According to him, each reportable disease burdened over-whelmed
departments. Despite the spotty reporting of E. coli O157:H7, the CDC knew thousands of prior
cases of illness caused by the disease. The CDC recognized a prevalence of the disease in
Northern states, a prevalence "observed for quite some time now." He stressed the emergence
of more food-borne diseases was expected. He emphasized that the combination of food
dispersal from a few companies, the differences in animal husbandry, the use of antibiotics, and
other changes to the lifestyles of people forced many microbes to evolve. This ongoing evolution
created-and would continue to create-more diseases. 31 Blake's testimony further
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demonstrated the scientific community's awareness, prior to the outbreak, of potential haz.ards
associated with E. coli O 157:H7. His testimony also stressed the expectation of similar future
outbreaks, due to the emergence of new strains of food-borne, illness-causing bacteria.
Dr. Archer, the representative of for the Food and Drug Administration, asserted in his
testimony to the subcommittee that establishment of a new system for regulation must occur. At
the time of the outbreak, the FDA did not regulate restaurants due to "finite resources." Instead,
the FDA recommended "model codes," a set of uniform, minimum, standards that it encouraged
states to adopt. The FDA relied on cooperation with states and restaurants to adhere to safety
recommendations. After Senator Murray asked Archer to explain the dissemination process of
information regarding new safety measures, Archer revealed that he did not know the method the
material reached restaurants.32 When compared to Nugent's previous statement that the
restaurant industry relied on government regulation to determine safety standards, Archer's
statements reveals that the regulatory body severely lacked communication, as well as the
necessary authority to enforce safety sanctions.
Regarding the needed changes, Archer reiterated that raising the internal cooking
temperature of ground beef patties could not be the only step in preventing future outbreaks. He
admitted that it could be the first, but not the only, step in illness avoidance. He endorsed farm to
table regulation by the Haz.ard Analysis and Critical Control Point System, or HACCP. Figure 4
provides an illustration of the core principals ofHACCP. Archer advocated this system because
it focuses on critical control points-the places in production that could have the most
detrimental effect if not regulated and controlled properly. In his opinion, this system "should
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force numbers of organisms down to a low and controllable level." When queried on the
feasibility of a system of detention, a system in which ground beef would be held until its safety
could be scientifically proven, Archer simply stated "it can be done." A similar system regulated
the shrimp industry. 33 Archer's comments to the subcommittee, from his insistence on a HACCP
system to regulate the beef industry to his revelation that a detention-based system existed for
shrimp, confirmed an awareness that the outdated system regulating beef shouldered the
responsibility, or at least part of it, for the devastating outbreak.
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Figure 4. Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points. ArcelorMittal. Accessed November I 1, 2017.
http://packaging.arcelormittal.com/456/521

The fourth panel called forth in the hearing consisted of three witnesses. The first, Dr.
James Marsden represented the American Meat Institute, while his counterpart Dr. John Marcy
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represented the Institute of Food Technology. The final witness of the panel, Carol Tucker
Foreman served as a representative for the SAFE Food Coalition.
The testimonies of Marsden and Marcy continued to confirm that the government system
of regulation prior to the outbreak reeked of outdated techniques and standards. Marsden
reassured the panel that the strain of E. coli could not resist heat, but condemned federal
guidelines as ''woefully inconsistent." Marsden then cited a study conducted in 1985 by the
National Academy of Sciences that recommended changes to the regulatory system and the
implementation of a HACCP system. He referenced a guideline-set out in 1989-by the
American Meat Institute that suggested an internal cooking temperature of 155°F for pre-cooked
ground beef patties. He stated that pre-cooked ground beef patties adhering to those guidelines
had no known associations with food born illness. He declared that "it has long been recognized
that the system needs to be modernized and directed more to controlling microbiological
hazards. " 34
Marcy's testimony asserted the effectiveness of the HACCP system and its reliance on
the knowledge-base of those involved in the system-from factory worker to consumer. Ignorant
individuals are less likely to participate fully in the safety measures laid out by the program.
However, according to Marcy, "we have a wealth of knowledge that we haven't educated,
communicated to other people." The public lacked education and awareness on proper cooking
of ground beef. Additionally, Marsden argued that improvement in communicating pertinent
information and acting on available knowledge for proper cooking and handling of ground beef
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is paramount to public health. He maintained that dissemination of proper, science-based
procedures· to the national community served as an urgent step in preventing future outbreaks. 35
The testimonies of Marsden and Marcy declared that the failure to utilize science and
update an antiquated system contributed to the cu1mination of the outbreak. Additionally, the
disappointing lack of communication to the public increased the likelihood of easily-avoidable
illness.
The testimony Foreman, the representative for the Safe Food Coalition, most directly
indicted the government for its failure to proactively regulate the meat industry. In her words,
''there's a pattern there, every time there's a serious food borne illness outbreak, there's a flurry
of activity ... and then it disappears and everyone seems to go back to business as usual."36
Despite her assertion that food safety is a shared responsibility, she suggested that the
Department of Agriculture-with its half a billion-dollar meat inspection budget-should be an
"appropriate object of investigation." She criticized the USDA's practice oflabeling meat with a
''tested for wholesomeness" label, as she felt that the department failed to assure safety. She
recommended the removal of the seal of reassurance and the replacement of a label detailing
food handling warnings and instructions. Foreman denounced the department for its conflict of
interest, for attempting to both protect the public and promote the sale of meat, for viewing
"regulated industry as both its peer group and its constituency." For example, after the outbreak,
Secretary Espy did not meet with public health officials. He met with industry representatives.
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She remained cautious regarding the new plans proposed by the USDA because they lacked
details on specific goals and their plans to accomplish them.37
Foreman reminded the subcommittee that the strain of E. coli responsible for the
outbreak, 0157:H7, had been well-documented since 1987. Compared to international meat
regulatory systems, the one in place prior to the 1993 outbreak appeared painfully focused on
animal health. According to Foreman, ''the system that exists now is mired in the past. I don't

think that it puts people and their health first. Its oriented, in fact, towards animal health. " 38
Foreman's frank and refreshing analysis of the USDA's shortcomings brought many important
issues before the subcommittee, issues regarding the regulatory system itself. She did not pander
with internal cooking temperatures. She did not advocate the addition of a HACCP system. She
did not attack Jack in the Box for serving the burgers that caused the sickness. She did not She
did not reveal the many shortcomings of the existing system, shortcomings she surely felt too
numerous to list. She criticized the source of these failings-the government agency at fault for
the antiquated regulatory system in place.
Overall, the Senate subcommittee hearing provided a wealth of insight into the attitudes
of various agencies regarding food safety, the role of the government, the role of science, and
those responsible for when an outbreak occurs. The first panel, which included the new Secretary
of the Department of Agriculture, focused primarily on proposed changes to the current system.
It carefully avoided discussing culpability at length. When it surfaced, the panel made comments
that food safety could not be the sole responsibility of the government or emphasized future
plans to address the issues that contributed to the outbreak. The subcommittee bombarded the
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second panel, composed entirely of a nervous Nugent-the President of Jack in the Box-with
specific, detailed questions regarding practices and procedures within his specific restaurant
chain. This, coupled with Nugent's uncertain replies, created a strong sense that the chain itself
shouldered the blame for the outbreak. While the restaurant failed to follow the state cooking
guidelines (the only state with a 155°F required cooking temperature), it adhered to the federal
protocols. The burgers passed all federal inspections.
The third panel revealed inherent communication issues between the regulatory
departments, the scientific researchers, and the industry itself. This panel also revealed an
awareness, prior to the outbreak, of the obsoleteness of the regulatory system in place. The fourth
panel confirmed awareness of E.coli 0157:H7, the antiquated nature of the system, and an
overall failure to communicate risks with the public. This panel-and only one witness on the
panel-addressed the shortcomings of the regulatory body itself. The government failed the
public through the lack of communication, refusal to update an archaic system, and by defying
science-based warnings regarding emerging pathogens. The careful construction of the hearing
prevented criticism of the regulatory body itself, and the valid accusations of this last witness
paled in comparison to the apprehensive image of a CEO called in to a hearing to answer for the
crimes of his company.

Byrd 28

Media Madness
There would come all the way back from Europe old sausage that had
been rejected, and that was moldy and white-it would be dosed with borax and
glycerine, and dumped into the hoppers and made over again for home
consumption. There would be meat that had tumbled out on the floor, in the dirt
and sawdust, where workers had tramped and spit uncounted billions of
consumption germs. There would be meat stored in great piles in rooms, and the
water from leaky roofs would drip over it, and thousands of rats would race about
on it. 39

Upton Sinclair's The Jungle created a frenzy for regulation after its 1906 publication. The
novel, such as the above passage, vividly described the filthy conditions of the meat production
industry. Initially written to draw attention to the plight of the men working under the terrible
circumstances, the scenes depicting the cavalier attitude towards cleanly manufactured meat
products stuck with Sinclair's audience. After President Theodore Roosevelt read the popular
novel and federal investigators confirmed the graphic scenes, he pushed the 1906 Meat
Inspection Act through Congress.40 The use of media, in this case a novel, effectively generated
the social pressure to force a change in the industry. The public did not want rats in their sausage
and expected the government to ensure the safety of their meat.
Increased demands for meat supported the development of a system mired in flaws.
Several common industry practices encourage the growth of microbes, such as E. coli. Cattle
feedlots, saturated with manure, are a prime habitat for many contagions. Often, the cattle will
ingest pathogen-carrying manure. Crammed feedlots spread disease rapidly through cattle herds.
However, raising cattle in these feedlots represents the cheapest method of raising beef for
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slaughter. 41 The spread of disease continues at the slaughterhouse, as infected knives and
machinery carry microbes from one carcass to the next. 42 A new diet fed to cattle also creates
issues. Cattle naturally eat grasses, not grains such as com. The industry favors a diet of com
because com is cheaper and fattens the animal more effectively. However, as cattle consume
increasingly more com, the environment in their stomach becomes more acidic. This acid-rich
interior creates an ideal environment for E.coli O157:H7.43 The practices of the meat industry
encouraged, instead of discouraged, the spread of disease. As in 1906, regulating these practices
at the federal level would require massive public outrage. As in 1906, the media wields the
power to encourage and direct public outrage. However, after the 1993 outbreak the confused
response of the media limited the pressure on the regulatory body to change industry practices.
Analyzing publications from the New York Times alone reveals the impotent response
that emerged in the wake of the 1993 outbreak. Publication of most articles occurred between
February and March of 1993. The short attention given to the outbreak by the media limited
prolonged public outrage. Furthermore, these articles often failed to reveal the many flaws of the
meat industry and its regulatory system. Instead, they brought attention to one company and a
too-low cooking temperature.
Analyzation and condemnation of the company that served diseased burgers to kids
appears frequently in the news coverage following the outbreak. The New York Times reported
that the public, furious, bombarded the company with "anonymous telephone callers accusing
them of being baby killers." Stocks in the company plummeted after the outbreak. Public
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relations experts condemned the company for refusing to accept the blame for the outbreak.44
The newspaper contributed to the sense that Jack in the Box (and its parent company,
Foodmaker) carried blame by announcing the cancellation of eighty-five new restaurant
openings.45 The focus on Jack in the Box demonstrates the intense scrutiny the company faced
because public suspicion its procedures caused the deaths of children. Language such as
"poisonings like Jack in the Box" and "sale of undercooked, disease-ridden hamburgers from
Jack in the Box," emerged following the outbreak. 46 This language connected the outbreak to the
company, but obscured the failures of the complex system that provided the beef.
The final 1993 coverage of the outbreak, published by the New York Times on December
20, reaffirmed the connections between Jack in the Box and the illness. It reported on the actions
of the administration following the outbreak, but detailed the litigation against Foodmaker and
the failure by Jack in the Box to pay the medical bills of the victims in a timely manner. 47 Once
again, Jack in the Box emerged as a culprit, strengthening the association between this outbreak
and the chain, as well as detracting attention from the flaws of the system it operated within.
A series of letters to the editor reveals the disorienting debate on the direction reform
needed to take following the outbreak. One article recommended all food products should
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undergo irradiation. Another letter to the editor entreated for the implementation of a "national
meat free diet." According to the author, this diet "would save more in health care costs than any
reform plan being discussed."48 One letter to the editor responded to the previous call for
mandatory food irradiation, condemning irradiation. 49 The myriad of recommended changes to
the system failed to succinctly report on the flaws of the system. Instead, these recommendations
obscured the past failure to regulate the system. The lack of public understanding of the system
and its flaws led to confused debate on the best course of action.
A few articles did address the failings of the government's regulatory system, although
often with the carefully neutral tone that frequently characterizes newspaper articles. The New

York Times compared the five-hundred and fifty food inspector vacancies to a new bout of
hiring, reporting that budget cuts and deregulation attributed to the recent decline of food
inspector positions. It questioned the need for twelve regulatory agencies, rather than the
institution of one agency. It also discussed the proposed future plans and actions already taken by
the federal government. so This created a more neutral and hopeful tone regarding the
performance of the federal government in its regulatory duties. Overall, it suggested that the
government and its system should fall under scrutiny, but not condemnation.
Another article detailed the outbreak, its victims, and the symptoms of the illness,
including hemolytic uremia syndrome. The article reiterated the new FDA suggested cooking
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temperature of 155°F, emphasizing consumer responsibilities, instead of flaws in the system. 51
The New York Times very briefly criticized the failings of the federal government's regulatory
system. 52 Mired in competing articles, the assignation of blame to the system established by the
federal government lost effectiveness, much like Foreman's testimony. The associations to Jack
in the Box and debate over the next course of action overwhelmed the connections between the
failings of the system and the incident.
The power of public outrage forced changes in 1906. It forced changes in 1993.
However, the scattered approach of the media in assigning responsibility for the outbreak.
crippled the effectiveness of response. The public could not find a definite culprit to blame. Did
the supplier to Jack in the Box fail to provide safe meat? Did Jack in the Box fail to cook the
patties correctly? Where did the system fail that lead to so many illness caused by eating a Jack
in the Box burger? The one consistent feature of the newspaper publishing regarding the
outbreak.: Jack in the Box made an appearance in almost all of them. Jack in the Box emerged as
the culprit that caused the sickness and death of children. Jack in the Box became strongly
associated with this outbreak., distracting from the antiquated federal regulatory system.

51 Lawrence

K. Altman, "The Doctor's World; Lessons Are Sought In Outbreak of Illness From Tainted Meat," New
York Times, February 9, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/09/science/the-doctor-s-world-lessons-are-soughtin-outbreak-of-illness-from-tainted-meat.html, (Accessed January 19, 2017).
52

Marian Burros, "Eating Well; Agricultural Department Policy Blamed for Tainted Food," New York Times, March
3, 1993. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/03/garden/eating-well-agriculture-dept-policy-blamed-for-taintedfood.html (Accessed January 17, 2017).

Byrd 33

After the Outbreak

Despite the scattered response from the media, the public placed enough pressure on
legislators to adjust the flawed system. Fear of future outbreaks forced the government raised the
federal cooking temperature to 155°F, set a goal to reduce the number of yearly E. coli infections
by half, and increased the amount of beef sampled and tested. The industry adopted the HACCP
system. Regulatory agencies continued to release warnings and reports on the organism and its
associations with beef. They conducted investigations and issued new recommendations to
reduce O157:H7 in the industry. Through the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, outbreaks of
E. coli O157:H7 continued to occur. They recalled millions of pounds of beef, tainted with E.

coli. Outbreaks and recalls associated with E. coli gradually dropped. 53 The 1993 outbreak
generated enough pressure to force some change within the industry. The implementation of
these changes required public concern. Recommendations from the scientific community did
little to impact the industry until the involvement of the public.
However, the regulation of the industry remains largely retroactive. The conditions on
feedlots have improved minimally, breeding new strains of disease. 54 Following an outbreak in
Europe during 2011, the federal government outlawed six strains of pathogenic E. coli. 55
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Scientists discovered these strains and connected them to food borne disease in 1988. Once
again, public fear of illness forced regulation. On January 4 2011, President Obama signed the
Food Safety Modernization Act into law. This act contains many proactive policies to prevent
outbreaks of food borne illness.
Five points addressing food safety summarizes the broad initiatives the FSMA seeks to
achieve. Firstly, the FSMA shifts food safety from a reactive position to a proactive position by
implementing comprehensive controls and the authority to prosecute intentional contamination.
The second initiative mandates frequent safety inspections, dependent on the risk factors of the
specific industries. A third initiative grants the FDA the power to mandate a food recall, if
deemed necessary. The FSMA stipulates that the FDA must first offer the company distributing
the suspect food to voluntarily recall it. Additionally, the FSMA sets the goal to address
weaknesses in regulating imported food. Finally, the FMSA seeks to enhance cooperation
between various food regulatory agencies.56
The Food Safety Modernization Act created over fifty new rules and guidance
documents. Section I 03 specifically describes a proactive approach to food industry regulation
that mirrors HACCP principles. It states that the industry must evaluate hazards, create controls
to limit hazards, record results, and maintain a standing record of hazard-prevention and
outcomes. Any facility that makes over $500,000 per year must abide by these preventative
measures. Section 111 represents another important section of the Food Safety Modernization
Act, or FSMA. Section 111 details the requirements for safe and sanitary transport of food. This
ensures that transportation of food to sites of distribution and consumption will not undermine
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safety measures taken at food production sites. 57 Nearly two decades after the Jack in the Box
outbreak, widespread regulation and reform to the food industry finally passed into law.
Despite this major victory in food-system regulation, the act did not receive funding. 58
The FDA estimates that food borne illness affects forty-eight million Americans per year,
roughly one out of every six people. One-hundred and twenty-eight thousand of these cases
require hospitalization, with approximately three-thousand deaths. 59 Many of these continue to
be cases of E.coli 0157, transmitted through food, specifically meat products. Without adequate
funding, the FSMA cannot implement the necessary changes to proactively prevent future
outbreaks. Once again, the costs associated with regulation prevent modification-until the
public becomes involved.
In the fall of 2015, a familiar problem consumed a popular food chain. Its guests, eagerly
consuming the food it offered, also consumed something far more insidious. Multiple diners
became ill. Some needed hospitalization. The culprit causing this calamity? Toxin-producing

Escherichia coli. 60 After connections between six of its locations, the chain, Chipotle, closed
forty-three restaurants. 61 The E.coli outbreak occurred as the FDA, utilizing authority granted in
the FSMA, launched an investigation into Chipotle's food safety practices, based on an unrelated
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outbreak earlier in the year. 62 Those affected by the E.coli outbreak filed a class-action lawsuit,
just as victims of the Jack in the Box outbreak had done nearly twenty years earlier. 63 Once
again, media attitudes towards the outbreak pinned responsibility on the chain, instead of the
regulatory body.
On the November 2, 2015, The New York Times published its first article covering the
outbreak. The article covered the measures that Chipotle took after the outbreak, including
closing forty-three locations. The article quoted the Chipotle communications director as
describing the closings as taken "out of an abundance of caution." This generated a sense that
Chipotle took the outbreak very seriously and had the situation under control. In a calm,
unsensational tone, the article referenced two other E.coli outbreaks that occurred recently, and
described both the symptoms of and treatment for E. coli. The article contributes to a sense that
the outbreak should not alarm the public, but that the public should be aware that Chipotle food
caused illness. 64 Two decades after the anxiety and confusion of the Jack in the Box outbreak, E.

coil causing widespread illness no longer panics the public or inspires the same media scrutiny.
The subsequent three articles, published in January, February, and September 2016,
focused on the new health measures Chipotle implemented after the outbreak. The first details
chain-wide store closings to retrain all employees. 65 The second touches on the numbers of
customers who contracted illness in the six separate food-poisoning outbreaks since the previous
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July. It also details the newest health measures at Chipotle: improved methods to clean lettuce
and grated cheese, blanching vegetables, handling raw meat "differently," and giving employees
paid sick leave. 66 The next article continues this vein by describing a handwashing timer, set to
remind all Chipotle employees to wash their hands every half-hour, increased recording of safety
procedures, and the creation of a new position in the restaurant, a food safety leader. It also
reintroduces a familiar character to the food-poisoning scene: James Marsden, hired as a safety
consultant. These articles contribute to the perception that Chipotle's new procedures ensured
safety at its restaurants. However, the public remained skeptical, despite media influence. The
connection of the chain restaurant to the outbreak, instead of the handling processes that caused
the outbreak and the failure to inspect these processes, pinned the responsibility of food safety
solely on the restaurant.
Two more articles reveal the public blame for the outbreak. A September 2016 New York

Times article describes a forty-five percent drop in the company's shares, despite extensive
marketing campaigns to restore its image as a healthy eating establishment. In this article,
Marsden specifically mentioned the Jack in the Box crisis of 1993 and stated that "no one has
ever had this kind of food safety crisis in the era of social media."67 Food poisoning outbreaks in
the world of social media have devastating consequences on a company's reputation. Two years
after the 2015 outbreak, an October 2017 New York Post article concludes that Chipotle still
struggles to win back its customers. The emphasis on new health measures, the marketing
campaign, delayed opening of new restaurants, and the introduction of new menu items all failed
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to recover the company to its former strength. 68 Its reputation, like its food, became tainted in
2015.
Unlike after the 1993 outbreak, the articles did not discuss a need for system-wide
adjustments, or even the relatively new FSMA. Government involvement in ensuring food safety
did not factor into the discussion. At the end of 2014, the gap between funding and operational
costs for the FSMA remained about three hundred million. By the end of 2016-after the
Chipotle outbreak-funding increases nearly halved that gap. 69 Once again, public concern over
the safety of their food generated retroactive Congressional response. However, a gap remains to
finance the FSMA to its fullest capacity. Pressure from the public will ultimately close this gap,
ensure that food regulatory bodies remain funded, and that regulations are based on proactive
measures and scientific understanding.
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Conclusion:
The government must make decisions to protect the public- from foreign policy to
debates over gun laws. This protection extends to public health concerns, particularly those
within regulated industries. The outbreak of 1993 demonstrates the importance of effective
communication between scientific communities and governing bodies. Furthermore, it reveals
that disregarding pleas, supported by scientific evidence, to institute important, system-wide
adjustments may cause avoidable devastation. Simple steps, such as cooking a hamburger patty
at a higher temperature or screening all bloody diarrhea for a strain of bacteria, may have a
profound impact on the ability to save lives.
The plethora of scientific data on E. coli O 157: H7 available before the outbreak
confirms awareness of the pathogen. Proactive measures based on emerging science could have
mitigated the consequences caused by this microbe. The subcommittee hearing, with the
reappearance of concerns regarding costs of reforms, revelations of poor communication, and the
defensiveness of government agencies clearly reveal the low priority the government placed on
inconvenient reforms. As long as reform remained a low priority to the public and the voters, it
remained a low priority to the government tasked with protecting them.
Foreman stated in her testimony to the subcommittee, ''there's a pattern there, every time
there's a serious food-borne illness outbreak, there's a flurry of activity ... and then it disappears
and everyone seems to go back to business as usual." The scattered responses to food-borne
illness contribute to the repeated failure to quickly overhaul a system rife with inefficiencies,
poor communication, and conflicted interests. The habitual association between a specific
company or product-in this case Jack in the Box and ground beef patties-hinders the
generation of a focused demand for system-wide reformation.
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The simple, but consistent, affiliation between a company and a crisis distorts the
complexities of a defective system. Propagation of direct pressure on the system and its
regulators is paramount in achieving the considerable reforms necessary to proactively address
public health concerns. However, this pressure is the most effective after-not prior-to a crisis.
System wide changes are unlikely to occur without media attention and public outrage.
Unfortunately, in 1993, these both came with the cost of hundreds of sick children and ultimately
the loss of four innocent lives.
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